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ARTICLES

SEPARATE AND OBEDIENT: THE]UDICIAL
QUALIFICATION MISSING FROM THE]OB
DESCRIPTION

''We must make certain that no judge is ever influenced in deciding a
case by the threat of being turned out of office because the decision, while
made in good faith, differs from the way those responsible for the judge's
retention might think it should have been decided. ,£

I. INTRODUCfION
The national debate about the role of judges, their qualifications and ideologies consumes news coverage, as evidenced by the
recent appointment hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito and the aborted nomination of Harriet Miers.
The American Bar Association is in the process of re-evaluating and
updating its Model Code of Judicial Conduct.~ The poverty of the
quality of the debate, with legislators on both sides of the aisle discussing a few political issues and largely ignoring issues of ethics
and temperament, leaves the public with little helpful information
about whether judicial candidates will abide by the Canons of Judicial Ethics,4 which may be the most reliable and pertinent standards
I J. Amy Dillard is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore
School of Law. She obtained her J.D. from Washington and Lee University School
of Law and her B.A. from Wellesley College. I offer thanks to my patient mentor,
Penny Pether; to my many research assistants, Dipal Shah, Geoffrey Meyer, Jennifer Travers, Cameron Arnold, and Elizabeth Tripodi; and to the retired judges,
before whom I had the pleasure of practicing law for many years, E. Robert
Giammittorio and Alfred D. Swersky; and to Karen Woody.
2 Symposium, A Call to Arm5: The Need to Protect The Independence of the Judiciary, 38
U. RICH. L. REv. 575, 577 (2004).
, See American Bar Association:Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2007).
4 See American Bar Association-Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2004 Edition,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007); Virginia's
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for evaluating judicial temperament and aptitude. Legislators
demonstrate discomfort with the power of judges, and they boldly
seek to limit the power of the judiciary and to circumscribe the of5
fices of Article III judges. Congress has at least threatened legislation to impeach judges, create term-limits, and reduce the number
6
of appeals judges. Despite the rhetoric to abandon the use of a
litmus test for judicial candidates, it remains apparent on the federal stage that legislators are, even if subconsciously, using one.
In Virginia, legislators openly apply a litmus test in the selection and reappointment processes for judges. With absolute control over the selection and reappointment process for all judges in
the Commonwealth, members of the Virginia General Assembly, in
session with no oral or written record and no method for capturing
legislative history, increasingly ask pointed ideological questions to
scrutinize judges who are carrying out their jobs ethically, in accordance with the law, and with courage. Virginia's original constitution granted control of the judiciary to its General Assembly.7
Throughout the 19th century, during two significant revisions of
the Virginia Constitution, the General Assembly retained its complete control over the selection and reappointment of every judge
s
in the Commonwealth. Today, the General Assembly maintains
absolute control of the Commonwealth's Judiciary.9 As recently as
Judicial System, Section III: Canons ofJudicial Conduct for the Commonwealth of
Virginia, http://www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/canons_1l2398.html (last visited Oct.
17,2007).
5 Joan Biskupic, Hill Repuhlicans Target Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, atAOl (noting that Republicans in the 104th and 105th Congress made at least seven attempts at amending the Constitution to create term limits and a mandatory reappointment process for federal judges) .
6

Id.

VA. CONST. (1776) (,The two Houses of Assembly shall, by joint ballot, appoint
Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and General Court,Judges in Chancery .
7

. . .").

Alex B. Long, An Histarical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and
J.L. & POL. 691, 715-16, 750-51 (2002). In 1815, the Commonwealth adopted a significantly revised Constitution wherein the General Assembly
ceded control over appointing the governor to direct popular election. Id. Mter
the Civil War, Congress required Virginia to create a new Constitution as a condition of readmission to the Union. Id. Virginia bucked the trend among the states
towards an elected judiciary, and the General Assembly held tightly to its exclusive
control over all members of the bench. Id.
9 vA. CaNST. art. VI, § 7 ("The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the
vote of a m:oyority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly
for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other courts of record shall be chosen
by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General
Assembly for terms of eight years.").
8

West Virginia, 18
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1970, the Commonwealth reviewed and retained her unique practice of granting absolute control over the judiciary to the General
Assembly.lO
The problem of selecting and applying a litmus test is not exclusive to Virginia, but the unique appointment process creates a
vortex of power for legislators to disable judges who take unpopular stands. If the point of appointing judges is to free them from
populist criticism at the ballot box, then Virginia has not accomplished her goal. In fact, legislators confront judges in closed hearings with no transcript for their constituents, thus making it easier
to confront judges with frank and base political criticism, bypassing
the need for true assessment of performance and criteria based on
judicial ethics, ability, and temperament.
The General Assembly maintains no legislative history or record of its proceedings.1I The history and process of judicial selection are entirely secret in Virginia, save for a few tenacious reporters' recollections. Accordingly, the data for this article is generally
ephemeral, comprising newspaper articles and interviews with
judges and other direct participants. Though my methodology is
somewhat unconventional, it is the only approach I have discovered
to obtain the information.
In Part One, I will examine the history of the selection and reappointment process and the procedure used by the General Assembly. I will survey the recent history of increased politicization of
the judicial selection and reappointment processes. In Part Two, I
will offer an overview of Virginia's Canons of Judicial Ethics and
will show how the Canons governing judicial ethics are a universal
guide in assessing judges. I will explain the role of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (lIRC) and the transparency of using complaints made to, and decisions rendered by, the Commission in assessing whether a sitting judge should be reappointed,
rather than secret and naked ideological questioning based on a
12
political litmus test. In Part Three, I will examine three case studies of highly qualified judges who experienced the ritual humiliation and intimidation of a litmus test reappointment process. Each
judge rendered a decision or a dissent that was well within the
bounds of the statutory and common law of Virginia. Each com10 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 739-46
(1974). "The Commission on Constitutional Revision considered alternative plans
[of judicial selection] .... The Commission saw no advantage to those plans over
the method ofjudicial selection in Virginia." Id. at 742.
II See Virginia
Division of Legislative Services-Legislative Reference Center,
http://dls.state.va.us/lrc/leghist.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
12 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-901 (West 2007).
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plied with the requirements of the Canons and would not have
been subject to lIRC review for misconduct.
This is a longstanding problem in Virginia that I am identifying, and solutions are not simple. I will conclude by offering a solution to stop the emergence of the litmus test and establish a review method for reappointment that requires the General Assembly
to determine (1) whether a judge has engaged in misconduct resulting in an investigation or reprimand by lIRC; and (2) whether
the judge has acted within the boundaries set by the Canons.
While many scholars examine what philosophies a judge should
ascribe to, few examine the mechanics of judicial qualification,
even in the aftermath of the aborted Harriet Miers nomination.
The impoverished national debate of what it means to be a good
judge may start with this examination of the laboratory that is Virginia, one based on the absolute control of the legislature in judicial selection.

II. PROCESS FOR SELECTION AND REAPPOINTMENT,lUDICIAL
RETIREMENT, AND RECENT POLlTIClZATION OF THE PROCESS

A. Legislative Control Over Appointment and Reappointment ofJudges
In Virginia, members of the General Assembly make appointments to the judiciary.13 Virginia is the only state that retains a
14
method ofjudicial selection by strict legislative appointment. This
method, as suggested by some critics, may prove advantageous by
overcoming the problem of voter apathy and offering an indirect
ls
legislator check. Legislative appointment determines who will fill
vacancies in the Commonwealth's Supreme Court, Court of Ap16
peals, Circuit Courts, and the General District Courts.
I' VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (''The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by
the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other courts of record shall be
chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the
General Assembly for terms of eight years. . .. Upon election by the General
Assembly, a new justice shall begin service of a full term.").
14 See
Judicial
Selection
Report-Chapter
4,
http://www.cga.ct.gov/pri/archives/200Qisreportchap4.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2007) (outlining several states' various methods ofjudicial selection and highlighting the Commonwealth of Virginia as the sole body to which the legislature nominates and elects its judges).
15 See, e.g., The League of Women Voters of Michigan: LWVMIJudicial Study 2002,
http://www.lwvrni.org/shared/judicialstudy2002.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007)
(providing the example that a voter may choose not to vote for her legislator if she
disapproves of the performance of the judge selected by her legislator).
16 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
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Established in 2000, the Joint Judicial Advisory Committee offers advice to the General Assembly on the qualifications of
17
judges.
Both lawyers and laypersons compose the fourteenmember committee. The group conducts interviews of potential
candidates and seeks input from state and local bar associations,
ls
civic groups, and citizens. Mter these organizations submit nominations and remarks about candidates to the committee, the committee evaluates the recommendations. In addition, several Republican legislators have created local citizen commissions to screen
nominees for both Circuit and District Court judgeships.19 The
committee then submits its findings to the House and Senate for
2o
consideration.
Virginia's judicial appointment scheme does not violate the
Federal Constitution's doctrine of separation of powers even
though it vests in the legislature absolute control over the judiciary.21 The separation of powers principle derives from the first
three articles of the United States Constitution which vests each of
the three branches of the United States government with their re-

I7 See LaToya Gray, Virginia's Judicial Selection Process, 9 J. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF LEGIS.
CLERKS
&
SECRETARIES
2,
14
(2003),'
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/aslcs/jrnFal103.pdf; GOP Forms Judges
Panel, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000, at B-4 (stating that the Republicans established this committee after the 1999 Republican gain of the majority in
both the House and the Senate); see also Judge Picking; Toward Merit-Selection; GOP
Reformers Want a Better Appointment Process-Stressing Qualifications, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Jan. 15, 2000, at B6 (noting the Republicans' desire to form a committee in order
to examine judges' qualifications).
18 See, e.g., Virginia Women Attorney's Association:Judicial Screening Process,
http://www.vwaa.org/judicial.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (giving an overview
of the VWAA Judiciary Committee in judicial appointments in Virginia). The
VWAAJudicial Committee gathers and disseminates information to its members
and to the public about potential candidates for state and federal judgeships in
the Commonwealth. ld. The Committee then gathers information from the candidate through interviews and references and offers recommendations about candidate positions and philosophies. ld. The Committee meets with this information and submits recommendations to the Board of Directors, who may choose to
endorse the candidate through a two-thirds mcyority vote. ld. The endorsements
are then sent to the applicable legislative appointing body. ld.
19 See Gray, supra note 17, at 15 (last visited Oct. 17,2007) (citingJudicial Selection
in Virginia: An Introduction, http://www.ajs.org/js/VA.htm) .
20 Judicial Selection in Virginia: An Introduction, http://www.CYs.org/js/VA.htm
(last visited October 17, 2007).
21 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (bestowing the legislative powers on Congress, which
consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives); see also U.S. Const. art.
II, § 1 (vesting the executive power of the United States in the President); U.S
Const. art. III, § 1 (conferring the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and inferior courts as established by Congress).
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spective powers.22 However, the U.S. Constitution does not dictate
a particular plan for the states' internal distribution of governmen23
tal powers. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
the separation of powers concept, although essential to the U.S.
Constitution, is not mandatory in state governments. 24
Although the Virginia Constitution also upholds a tripartite arrangement of the state government, Virginia's judicial appointment
scheme most likely does not violate its Constitution's separation of
25
powers doctrine. In the past, when confronted with an allegation
that a statute or an activity by a government department may violate
this separation of powers principle, the Virginia Supreme Court has
26
applied the "whole power" doctrine. The Court has held that no
Article III violation exists where the "whole power" doctrine has not
27
been violated. Virginia has relied on the "whole power" doctrine
to justify the legislative branch's encroachment upon the executive
28
branch and the executive branch's encroachment upon the judi•
29
Clary.

See U.S. CONST. art. I-III.
See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974)
(noting that the Federal Constitution "does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution of governmental powers").
24 See Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957).
25 See VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ('The legislative, executive, and judicial departments
shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging
to the others, nor any person exercise the power of more than one of them at the
same time .... ").
26 See Winchester & Strasburg R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E. 692, 694 (Va.
1906) (explaining that the meaning of the whole power doctrine is "that the whole
power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of either of the other departments").
27 [d. at 693-94 (contending that it is possible for some of the powers of the three
branches to be united without violating the Constitution).
28 See BaIiles v. Mazur, 297 S.E.2d 695, 700--01 (Va. 1982) (upholding a Virginia
statute empowering the General Assembly to authorize or reject projects proposed
by the Virginia Public Building Authority, which is under the authority of the executive branch); see also NAACP v. Comm. on Offenses Against the Admin. of Justice, 101 S.E.2d 631, 635, 640 (Va. 1958), vacated, 358 U.S. 40 (1958) (purporting
that the legislative department can properly investigate the manner and result of
law enforcement and execution by the executive branch).
29 See Tross v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 523,530-31 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that judicial intake officers, who are executive officers, do not exercise the whole
power of the judiciary when these officers determine whether sufficient probable
cause exists to authorize petitions charging criminal offenses during the Virginia
juvenile intake process).
22

2'
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B. Judicial Selection and Reappointment Process Used try the Legislature
The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote
of a m,yority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other
courts of record shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the
members elected to each house of the General Assembly for
terms of eight years .... Upon election by the General Assem30
bly, a new justice shall begin service of a full term.

For reappointment, a judge must interview with a legislative
committee and subsequently receive a majority vote in the legisla31
ture.
All Virginia Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit
Court, and General District Court judges are subject to this proc32
ess. Members of the legislature became concerned that the legislature did not have the faculties to adequately review members of
the judiciary. 33 The legislature attributed this to its members' parttime nature and the diminishing number of practicing attomeys.34
In response, H.B. 2445, enacted during the General Assembly's
2001 session, established a pilot program for local judicial review
35
and nominations. Under H.B. 2445, judges are evaluated in the
36
year before their term expires.
The evaluations serve two purposes: first, as a method of informing professional development for
judges, and second, as an information source for reappointment
37
purposes.

SeeVA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
Judicial Selection in the States: Virginia-Current Methods of Judicial Selection,
http://www.ajs.org/js/va_methods.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (explaining
that the Courts of Justice Committees of the House of Delegates and the Senate
interview candidates who seek reelection, and these candidates are then voted on
by both full houses) .
.. See id. (explaining that all judges are subject to the interview process prior to the
election and reelection process).
"See H.RJ. Res. 212, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000), available oJ
http://legl.state.va.us/ cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001 +fiIi+HJ212ER+pdf (establishing a
task force to design ajudicial performance evaluation program) .
... See id. Membership in the Virginia General Assembly is not full-time employment, as the General Assembly meets for only thirty days in odd-numbered years
and sixty days in even numbered years. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
SeeVA. CONST. art. IV, § 6
35 H.R.
2445, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2001),
available at
http://legl.state.va.us/ cgi-bin/legp504.exe?0 11 +ful+HB2445+pdf.
!!6 Id. (mandating that the report of the judge's evaluation shall be transmitted to
the clerks of the House and Senate).
" Id. See a£w H.R.J. Res. 212.
go

31
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C. judicial Retirement
The General Assembly creates a structural incentive to serve as
a judge, hoping to attract potential candidates to reappointment by
offering a well-pronounced financial reward. The most highly
qualified members of the Virginia Bar generally earn significantly
more money than their judicial counterparts on the bench. Beyond the honor and duty of serving on the bench, the retirement
benefit may be the only financial incentive that a successful practicing lawyer would lose out on by not becoming a judge who is a public servant at a much-reduced salary.
The General Assembly enacts and enforces laws stipulating the
conditions, duties, and compensation concerning the retirement of
38
judges and justices. The General Assembly granted the Board of
Trustees of the Virginia Retirement System (VRS) authority to administer the Judicial Retirement System, which regulates the com39
pensation awarded to retiringjudges.
Through VRS, judges acquire eligibility for unreduced retire40
ment benefits based on age at retirement and years of service.
VRS sets the retirement benefit based on an average of the thirtysix months of highest salary.41 If the General Assembly appointed
or elected ajudge to an original term on or after January 1, 1995,
he or she earns two and one-half years of weighted service credit
42
for each year of full-time service as a judge. However, a judge appointed or elected before January 1,1995, will earn three and one43
half years of weighted service.
Ajudge may retire with a reduced benefit as early as age fiftyfive if he or she has at least five years of credited service. 44 If a
judge does not meet the age or service requirements for retire45
ment, VRS reduces the benefits.
Judicial Retirement Service
.. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
'9 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-300, -302 (West 2007).
40 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-305, -306 (West 2007).
41 See
Virginia
Retirement
Systemjudicial
Retirement
System,
http://www.varetire.org/employers/benefitplans/jrs.html(last visited Oct. 17,
2007) (noting that judges are eligible for unreduced retirement benefits at age 60
if they have thirty years of service and at age 65 if they have at least five years of
credited service) .
• 2 SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-303 (West 2007) (explaining that credited service is the
total of weighted and unweighted service).
43 See id.
4. § 51.1-305.
45 See Judicial Retirement System, supra note 41 (explaining that benefits will be
reduced one-half percent per month for the first sixty months and four-tenths
percent for each additional month an individual falls short of meeting the age or
service requirements for an unreduced benefit).
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members who the General Assembly appointed to an original or
subsequent term after July 1, 1993, must retire at age seventy.46 The
retirement must be within twenty days of the convening of the next
regular session of the General Assembly after the member reaches
age seventy.47 If appointed before January 1995, ajudge may reach
the maximum benefit after thirteen years of actual service as a
judge. If appointed after January 1995, ajudge will meet his or her
maximum after eighteen years of actual judicial service. For example, a thirty-seven year old woman could be appointed to the
bench, obtain reappointment twice, and retire at fifty-five. She
could return to practice and still receive her full judicial retirement
benefits (likely, upwards of $130,000 annually) for the rest of her
life.
For these reasons, judges will most likely seek reappointment
to reach their maximum benefit for retirement. The financial incentive is tremendous, especially given the pay cut most judges take
when they abandon private practice for the bench. Because no
justice or judge in Virginia has a term that is greater than twelve
years, reaping the benefits of the retirement system requires reap48
pointment.
For instance, if the General Assembly appointed a
judge to an eight-year term in 1996, the judge would need to seek
reappointment twice in order to be eligible for the maximum retirement benefit allotment in 2014.
The General Assembly sets out all judicial compensation,
though cities and counties may supplement salaries of any local
49
judges within their geographical boundaries. As of October 2004,
Virginia ranked above the mean among all the states and provinces
50
of the United States for judicial compensation.
Specifically, in
2001, a Supreme Court justice in Virginia received about $135,000
plus $6,000 in expenses, compared to the average $127,169. 51 Furthermore, a judge on the Court of Appeals of Virginia received
$128,730, in contrast to the national average of $123,629. 52 The
average Virginia trial court judge received $125,795, compared to
$110,330 nationally.53 Overall, Virginia pays the fifteenth highest
46

§ 5l.l-305.

[d.
SeeVirginia-Current Methods ofJudidal Selection, supra note 3l.
49 SeeVA. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
50 See Survey ofJudicial Salaries, 29 National Center for State Courts 2 (2002), available
at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/kisjudcomJudSallOOl04Pub.pdf.
51 [d.
52 [d.
53 [d.
47
48
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wage in the union to its Supreme Court justices, the twelfth highest
to its Court of Appeals judges, and the tenth highest to its trial
court judges. 54 To understand how the General Assembly values its
judges, consider that Virginia ranks in the bottom five in expenditures for kindergarten through high school level education, wel55
fare, and natural resources.

D. Brief History of the Recent Politicization oj theJudicial Reappointment
Process and Unsuccessful Reform Efforts
For the greater part of the twentieth century, the Democratic
Party in Virginia maintained control over the General Assembly.56
In the late 1990s, partisan struggles in the General Assembly in57
creasingly shaped the selection of Virginia's judges. For several
decades, the Democratic Party maintained control over the Senate
and consequently, also controlled the judicial selection process due
to its veto power.58 This changed in 1995 when the Senate became
evenly split along party lines. 59 In 1996, the General Assembly
failed to fill thirty percent of judicial vacancies due to partisan
squabbles,60 requiring Governor George Allen to appoint judges to
61
these positions after its session ended. Interim judicial appointments expire at the beginning of the following General Assembly
session and are not renewable without appointment by the General
Assembly; 62 thus, they offer no job security for the appointed judge.

54

Id.

Bill Sizemore, Virginia Ranks Near Bottom of the Class, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 22,
2002,atAl.
56 Warren Fiske, Reachingfor a Renaissance for Gov. Georf!.e F. Allen, The Republican
Party s Leading Man in Virginia, Nov. 7 Will Be a Defining MOTJUmt as the GOP Seeks To
Wrest Control of the General Assembly, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 29,1995, at A-I, available
at
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VAPilot/issues/1995/vp951029/10290142.htm.
57 See Ross MacKenzie, Editorial, On the Growing Parlisanization of the General Assembly, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at F-7 (noting that the General Assembly'S partisanship left a number of vacancies to interim appointments).
58 See Laura LaFay & Robert Litde, Judging by Gridlock, Allen Will Pick New Justice
Parlisanship Hinders State'sJudicial Selection,. VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 23, 1997, at A-I,
available
at
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VAPilot/issues/1997/vp970223/02230181.htm.
55

Id.
See MacKenzie, supra note 57.
61 Id.
See also William Ruberry, Odd Coalition Likes System as It Is; Critics Suggest Merit
Selection of State Judges, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 1995, at Al ("When the
59

60

Virginia General Assembly is out of session, interim judicial appointments for
Circuit, Appeals and Supreme courts fall to the governor .... ").
62 VA. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
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As a result, few qualified candidates are able to accept an interim
appointment.
In February 1997, Democrats attempted to reappoint Judge
David B. Summerfield to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
63
Court.
However, Republican Senator William C. Wampler, Jr.
argued that Judge Summerfield's position should go to Greg Baker,
64
a law partner of Republican Delegate Terry G. Kilgore. Republicans denied that this decision was based on patronage, claiming
that they were troubled by Judge Summerfield's "demeanor" and
allegations that Summerfield behaved in a "condescending" man65
ner towards attorneys who appeared before him.
The General
Assembly not only declined to reappoint Judge Summerfield; it
66
failed to appoint a replacement.
Mter Virginia Supreme Court Justice Roscoe B. StephensonJr.
announced his retirement, Democrats and Republicans in the
67
General Assembly fought over whom to appoint to replace him.
Democrats chose Margaret P. Spencer, an Mrican-American General District Court judge from Richmond. 68 Republicans in the
Senate sought former Roanoke Delegate G. Steven Agee. 69 Refusing to even question Spencer as a viable candidate, Senate Republicans walked out of the Senate Courts of the Justice Committee's
planned interview with Spencer.70 On the day before the General
Assembly was scheduled to adjourn for the year, a fierce debate
ensued. 71 The conflict ended in a stalemate. 72 In May, Governor
Allen appointed Cynthia D. Kinser, a Republican federal judge, to
fill the vacancy, and in its following term, the General Assembly
appointed Judge Kinser.73
6' See Ruth S. Intress & Michael Hardy, House, Senate at Impasse on Judicial Appoint-

ments, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1997, at A-10.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Jeff E. Schapiro, Lawmakers Battle Over Appointment, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
64

Feb. 18, 1997,atA~.
68 Jeff E. Schapiro, Democrats Back Richmond Judge for Top Court; GOP Senators Favor
Roanoke Republican, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 19,1997, at A-6.
69 Id. See also Spencer S. Hsu, Virginia Lawmakers Haggle Over Supreme Court Nominee;
New Member Could Shift Balance of Pane~ WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at DOl.
70 Jeff E. Schapiro, Beyer Supports Black Judge; Republicans Scored for Shunning City's
Spencer, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 20,1997, atA-1.
71 Jeff E. Schapiro, Legislators Fail to Elect Justice of Supreme Court, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Feb. 22,1997, atA-7.
72 Id.
See also Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Lawmakers at Impasse Over NamingJustice; Politics
Stymie Appointment; Bills May Be Delayed or Killed, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1997, at COl.
" Warren Fiske & Laurence Hammack, Allen Taps Judicially Conservative Woman for
Supreme Court Post, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 3, 1997, at B5. See also Ellen Nakashima,
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That same year, Senate Democrats' attempted to reappoint
Clarke County Circuit Court Judge James L. Berry, who famously
refused to grant a gun permit to Oliver North. This attempt also
ended in a stalemate, when Republicans sought to replace Judge
74
Berry with attorney John Reed Prosser. Once again, the stalemate
left the Republican Governor with the option to appoint a judge
during the interim. Governor Allen eventually appointed Prosser,
thereby unseating Berry. 75
In 1998, the House of Delegates remained evenly split along
76
party lines, while Republicans gained a majority in the Senate. On
January 31, 1998, a "nine-hour standoff" occurred after Thelma
Drake, the only Republican among four delegates from Norfolk,
fought her Democratic colleagues' attempt to appoint Joseph A.
77
Leafe, former Mayor of Norfolk, to the Norfolk Circuit Court.
When the standoff ended, thirty positions, including the one for
78
which Leafe vied, remained vacant. Although General Assembly
members managed to agree upon the appointment of fIfty-six
judges,79 they decided to put off making decisions about the other
80
positions until the following month. Republicans and Democrats
81
eventually agreed to appoint Leafe to the position.
In March 1998, the General Assembly appointed ten judges,
but Republicans and Democrats could not agree upon a candidate
82
for the Virginia Court of Appeals. In October 1998, Democrats in

Allen Na1TU3s Moderate Republican Woman to Va. High Court, WASH. POST, May 3, 1997,
at B03.
7. See Michael Hardy, Allen Ousts Judge, Na1TU3s Successor; Assembly Had Deadlocked on
Post, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 8, 1997, at M.
75 Id.
76 Laura LaFay & Ledyard King, Party Fight in Legislature Delays Leafe's Judge Quest;
Norfolil Del. Drake Stirs Up Wrath in Both Houses, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 31, 1998, at
AI.
77 Id. Drake, claiming the Democrats from the Norfolk delegation left her "out of
the judicial loop," refused to back Leafe's appointment "unless she was guaranteed
veto power over the selection of Norfolk's new Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court judgeship." Id.
78 Id.
,. Id.
80 Pamela Stallsmith & Tyler Whitley, GOP Gets Say on Judges; Democrats See Power
Play; S01TU3 Decisions Wait, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATcH,Jan. 31, 1998, at A-I.
81 Jon Frank, FOT1lU3T Mayor Starts 3rd Career, With Gave~· Leafe Now Serving as Norfolk's
Newest Circuit Court Judge, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 28, 1998, at BI. At this time, Republicans and Democrats also agreed upon a candidate for the Juvenile and Domestic Relations judgeship that had been at the center of the struggle between
Thelma Drake and her Democratic colleagues on the Norfolk delegation. Id.
82 Pamela Stallsmith, 10Judges Elected; 1 Spot Open, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar.
16,1998, atA-8.
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the General Assembly proposed establishing a non-partisan judicial
nomination commission, despite the fact that Democratic General
Assembly members had resisted similar suggestions in the past.83 In
84
1998, Republicans were the ones rejecting the idea.
Neither party is more to blame than the other for politicizing
the judicial selection and reappointment process, though the most
extensive reporting has occurred in recent years while the Republicans have been in control of both houses of the General Assembly.85
Mter the 1999 election, Republicans maintained a 21-19 majority in
86
the Senate and gained a 52-47 majority in the House. Republicans
in the General Assembly almost immediately pushed for a move
87
towards merit-selection of judges. In 2000, the House of Delegates and the Senate passed House Joint Resolution No. 212, requesting "the Judicial Council o~ the Supreme Court of Virginia ...
recommend evaluation criteria for the judiciary."88
In January 2000, Republican General Assembly members established citizens' committees in various localities to "complement
the recommendations of local bar associations.,,89 Until the recent
changes in procedure by the General Assembly, local bar associations have played an integral role in vetting and offering candidates
90
for the bench. That same month, Republican General Assembly
members announced their plans to establish "a GOP-controlled
commission to advise state lawmakers on judicial appointment.,,91
For example, Republican General Assembly members from Virginia
Beach and Norfolk created committees to screen local judicial candidates. 92 Although Norfolk has more Democrats than Republicans

83 Tyler Whitley, GOP Lmes Way of PickingJudges, Wants Its Chance, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1998, at B-5.
84 Id.
85 See Interview with E. Robert Giarnmittorio, Chief Judge Alexandria General
District Court, in Alexandria, Va. Ouly, 2003) (on file with author). Judge Giarnmittorio spoke at length about the trouble that Republicans had getting any judge
selected by Republicans onto the bench during the many years that the Democrats
controlled both houses in the General Assembly. Id.
86 Stephen Dinan, Vi1ginia GOP in Driver's Seat After the Long Road to Victory, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at Cl.
87 Editorial, Judge-Picking; Toward Merit-Selection; GOP &formers Want a Better Appointment Process-Stressing Qualifications, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 15,2000, at B6.
86 H.R]. Res. 212.
89 GOP Forms Judges Pane~ supra note 17.
90 Interview with Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay, Selection Committee Members.
91 R. H. Melton & Justin Blum, GOP Leaders Leap at Chance to Reform Court Selections,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12,2000, at B05.
92 Jennifer Peter, Vi1ginia: GOP Wants OPen Process of EvaluatingJudicial Candidates,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 12,2000, at AI.
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in the General Assembly, Republicans choose the members of the
93
Norfolk committee.
By late January 2000, Republicans had established the Joint
Judicial Advisory Committee and appointed all fourteen members
of the "bipartisan panel.,,94 Democratic General Assembly members
95
considered a resolution backing the creation of the Committee.
Some who opposed the resolution argued that going on record in
support of the Republicans' plan would create the impression that
Democrats had "thrown in the towel and given up on its chances of
winning back control.,,96 Others asserted that the Committee gave
Republicans more power because they would be in charge of selecting its members. 97 Those who favored the resolution contended
that the Democratic party owed its recent losses, in part, to its
98
members' resistance to merit-based selection of judges.
Ulti99
mately, the Democratic legislators voted down the resolution.
In March of 2000, Democrats cried foul when Suffolk Delegate
Chris Jones chose Norfolk-based attorney D. Arthur Kelsey for a
position as a Circuit Court judge in Suffolk, despite his lack of faloo
miliarity with Suffolk's legal landscape.
That same month the
General Assembly also elevated appellate judge Donald W. Lemons
to the Virginia Supreme Court with little controversy.lOl
As the 2000 General Assembly Session drew to a close, the Richmond Times-Dispatch claimed that "the new system worked," because
the bipartisan JointJudicial Advisory Committee had reviewed most
of the candidates for various judgeships that year and "the Assembly agreed on the appointments with a minimum of partisan bickering.,,102 However, others pointed out that the m~ority of the

93 Matthew Dolan, State Looks at Ways to judge the judges A Growing Movement, Led by
Republicans, Aims to Make Tlwse on the Bench More Accountable for Their Performances,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2001, atAl.
94 Metro in Brief: Vi7ginia: GOP's Picks for judicial Advisory Pane~ WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
2000, at B3;Judiciai Selection in Virginia, supra note 20.
95 Tyler Whitley, Proposal on judges Rejected; Democrats Dislike Merit Selection Plan,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2000, at C-l.
96 [d.
97 [d.
98 [d.
99 [d.
100 Meredith Kruse, judicial Pick is "Radical Departure" DeL Chris jones Picks "Outsider"
for Circuit Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 4, 2000, at Bl.
101 Jeff E. Schapiro, Lerrwns Voted to Vi7ginia High Court; 22 Others Appointed to State
judgeships, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 2000, at A-6.
102 Editorial, judicial Selection, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 17, 2000, at A-14.
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members of the Committee were Republicans, as were many of the
. d ges. 103
newJu
In September 2003, David Baugh, a criminal defense lawyer
from Richmond, fIled suit in a Richmond Circuit Court seeking an
injunction prohibiting members of the General Assembly from
questioning candidates for judgeships about previous decisions or
104
decisions they might make in future cases.
According to Baugh,
the General Assembly's interrogation sessions violated the Virginia
Constitution that mandates the three branches of government re. "separate an d d"lstmct. ,,105
mam

III. THE CANONS AND THEJUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW
COMMISSION: THE TRANSPARENT METHODS FOR REVIEW

A. Canons ofJudicial Ethics

Several of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Common106
wealth of Virginia are applicable to judicial reappointment. The
following describes the Canons and the Sections (each of which is
authoritative) and the Commentary (which is advisory)107 that
should direct the decision-making and conduct of Virginia judges.
Canons are available in each state as a guide for judges' comportment both on and off the bench, and many state legislatures turn
to the ABA Model Code for Judicial Conduct as a guide. lOB
The General Assembly charged the judges of the Commonwealth with the task of interpreting and applying the laws by strict
adherence to the Canons. I09 A fundamental doctrine of the Canons
is that judges adjudicate matters with disregard for political views
110
and motivations. For instance, Canon Three, "AJudge Shall Perform the Duties ofJudicial Office Impartially and Diligently," mandates a duty of political indifference, stating that a 'Judge shall not
be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism. "lll The General Assembly further determined in Canon
10. Michael Hardy & Jeff E. Schapiro, Rating the New Leadership; Legislators See Assem-

bly Session in Differrmt Lights, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 12,2000, at A-I.
Alan Cooper, Baugh Sues Over Questions Posed to Judges, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2003, at B-3.
I05Id. (citing VA. CONST. art. III, § 1).
106 See Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
107
Id .
104

See grmerally Model Code ofJudicial Conduct 2004 Edition, supra note 4.
See Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
110 See id. (noting that Canon 1 indicates that the standards of Virginia's judicial
system are based on the concept of a fair and independent judiciary).
111 See id.
108

109
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Three that a judge shall be "faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.,,1l2 The Canons stipulate that a judge must
perform duties without bias or prejudice: A judge shall not, "by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice ... based upon race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status. ,,113
The commentary to Canon One, "A Judge Shall Uphold the
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary,,,1l4 notes that the "integrity and independence of judges depends in turn upon their
acting without fear or favor. Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law, including the provisions of
these Canons.,,1l5 Canon Two emphasizes the importance of judicial appearances, stating that a judge "shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."ll6 The General Assembly has made it
ll7
clear that politics should not affect judges.
Furthermore, the
General Assembly's evaluation process will comprise of a review of
the judge's commitment and strict adherence to these rules of impartiality, the application of the law, and freedom from partisan
tensions.1l8
Political impartiality should not only pervade judicial decisionmaking and serve as the primary basis for review during reappointment, but theoretically, it should also serve as fundamental
criteria in judicial selection. When determining whether to appoint a judge or justice, the General Assembly seeks input from

See id.
'" See id. (explaining that Canon 3B(5) outlines that this does not preclude proper

112

judicial consideration when such demographic factors are issues in the proceeding).
114 See id.
115 See Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
116 See id. (explaining that Canon 2(A) requires that judges must avoid conflicts of
interest and make decisions based on a neutral application of the law without
influence from external factors). In addition, commentary to Canon 2(b) states
that "[m]aintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of government in which the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative branches." Id.
117See id.
118 See id. (explaining, in the preamble, that any transgression in the canons may
lead to the discipline of the judge). The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission,
composed of judges, lawyers, and non-lawyer citizens elected by the General Assembly, investigates complaints and takes appropriate disciplinary steps if necessary. See Virginia's Judicial System-About the Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission, http://www.courts.state.va.us/pamphlets/inquiry.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2007).
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several different groups, including local bar associations 1l9 and the
120
Virginia State Bar.
These organizations evaluate judges using
general guidelines that include several characteristics, including
but not limited to, "integrity, judicial temperament, impartiality,
legal skills, health, management skills and public service.,,12\ In
many ways, the characteristics mirror the actual attitudes that the
Canons demand that judges embody. Political motivations, personal religious or moral beliefs, and attitudes or opinions about
122
social issues are not among the criteria.
The criteria focus on
examining the entire body of a judge's work, not isolated or specific opinions. The Virginia State Bar explicitly advises against focusing on the personal beliefs of judges, stating that "there should
be no issue-oriented litmus test for selection of a candidate.,,123
B. Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission Review Procedures

Virginia's Bill of Rights states that "[tJhe legislative, executive,
and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate
and distinct. ,,124 Article III explains that separation of powers is
necessary "so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to
the others.,,125 In Article VI, § 10, entitled "Disabled and Unfit
Judges," the Virginia Constitution empowers the General Assembly
126
to create the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.
The
Commission may investigate charges asserted against judges and
"[iJf the Commission finds the charges to be well-founded, it may
file a formal complaint before the Supreme Court.,,127 The Virginia
Supreme Court shall then conduct a hearing to determine whether
a judge shall be retired, removed, or censured. 128 The Commission
sometimes "settles" complaints through arbitration or other means
·
. a h eanng.
. 129
W h lC h d a not reqmre
Interview with Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay, Selection Comm. Members.
See Jessie Halladay, lWIat Makes a Fit Judge? Criteria Are Debated; Nothing Specific Set
in Virginia Law. DAILY PRESS, Jan. 17, 2003, at A7, available at
http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-33782syOjan17.0.4296151.story.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 VA. CaNST. art. I, § 5.
125 VA. CaNST. art. III, § 1.
126VA. CaNST. art. Vi, § 10.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 This author was subpoenaed as a witness on behalf of a judge facing a Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission complaint, but because the judge and the complaining party arbitrated a result that did not result in the need for a hearing to
determine whether the judge would be removed, this author did not testify.
119

120
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If the Supreme Court after the hearing on the complaint finds
that the judge has engaged in misconduct while in office, or
that he has persistently failed to perform the duties of his office,
or that he has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice, it shall censure him or shall remove
130
him from office.
The Canons also control the conduct of Virginia's judges.
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent,
fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws
that govern us. . . . The text of the Canons and Sections is intended to govern conduct of judges and to be binding upon
them. It is not intended, however, that every transgression will
result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should
be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application
of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others
131
or on the judicial system.

IV. CAsE STUDIES
There is a tension in the text of Virginia's Constitution and the
Rules of the Court between the preservation of an independent
judiciary and oversight by the legislature. As we examine the cases
where the increasing politicization bore fruit of an ideological litmus test, we should ask whether the General Assembly even used
the rules of the Canons in its assessment. We should ask ourselves
whether the legislature acted in accordance with the principles and
spirit of Virginia's governing documents. We should ask include
whether a judge, "engaged in misconduct while in office;" "persistently failed to perform the duties of his office;" "engaged in conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice;,,132 and
whether the legislature, when employing "reasonable and reasoned
application of the text," found a serious "transgression" or "pattern
of improper activity" that had a significant effect "on others or on
the judicial system.,,133
Before moving into the three case studies, two examples help
set the stage. In February 2001, Republicans blocked Democrats'
CONST. art. VI, § lO.
See Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
1>2 VA. CONST. art. VI, § lO.
133 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4 (describing, in the preamble, the
manner in which the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission should interpret
and apply the Canons).
IlIOVA.
101
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attempt to reappoint Judge Katherine Howe Jones, an MricanAmerican woman, to her position on a Norfolk General District
134
Court.
Although the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission
had never sanctioned Judge Jones, GOP leaders cited allegations
that she "regularly yelled at victims and defendants, cut off witness
testimony and laced her rulings with unnecessary sarcasm.,,135 Republicans further claimed thatJudgeJones had "very serious issues"
and displayed "bizarre behavior.,,136 However, the General Assembly's Courts of Justice Committee refused to grant Judge Jones a
hearing in which she could address the allegations. 137 Norfolk
Delegate William P. Robinson, a Democrat, along with the local
NAACP, felt that the Republicans' move was "racially motivated.,,138
Democrats responded to the Republicans' attack on Judge
Jones by grilling former prosecutor Norman A. Thomas, the Re39
publican choice for Judge Jones's position.1 Democrats noted that
the state bar was currently investigating Thomas and that the local
bar association previously rated him as "unqualified" to be a
140
judge.
Nonetheless, the Republican-controlled General Assembly, by majority vote, appointed Thomas to Judge Jones's posi141
tion.
The example involving former Judge Verbena M. Askew is
perhaps most indicative of the fierceness of the conservative
agenda. Conservatives in the house delayed reappointing Askew, a
Circuit Court judge from Newport News, and eventually voted to
142
remove her from the bench.
During Askew's 2003 reappointment proceedings, the House Courts of Justice Committee, led by
Republican Delegate Robert McDonnell, questioned Askew for
seven hours about her sexual orientation and about alleged sexual
134 Matthew Dolan & Christina Nuckols, GOP Blocks Judge's 2nd Appointment to Bench
Republican:Jurist's Behavior Led to Move, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 10,2001, at BI. The
general district courts in Virginia are courts not of record, so there is little concrete evidence from which the Committee could assess Judge Jones's behavior. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.5 (West 2007).
m Dolan & Nuckols, supra note 134.
1% Id.
137 Christina Nuckols, Judge Won't Get Hearing, Say Two Key Lawmakers Stolle Joins
Critics, Saying Courtroom Press Conference Was Sign of Indiscretion, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Feb. 16,2001, at B4.
138 Dolan & Nuckols, supra note 134.
13' Matthew Dolan, Democrats Turn Up Heat on Candidate for Judgeship, VIRGINIANPILOT, Feb. 21, 2001, at BI.
14°Id.
141 Matthew Dolan, Democrats Unable to Salvage Norfolk Judgeship for Jones, VIRGINIANPILOT, Feb. 22, 2001, at B4.
142 Tyler Whitley & Alan Cooper, Judge Will Not Be Re-Elected; Askew Will Vacate Newport News Spot, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2003, atAI.
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encounters, rather than about her perfonnance as ajudge. 143 The
interrogation focused on a sexual harassment claim lodged by a
female worker that was settled out of court by the City of Hamp. d wrongd'
ton. 144 Askew repeate dl y d eme
omg. 145
Delegate Kenneth Melvin (D-Portsmouth) stated that "hearsay
was rampant" at Askew's hearing and that the Committee's focus
on sexual orientation was "nothing more than a philosophical litmus test.,,146 Delegate Flora Crittenden (D-Newport News) reiterated complaints about the Committee's conduct, stating that Askew
"was treated like a common criminal.,,147
The Republicancontrolled General Assembly denied Askew's reappointment, basing their decision on claims that Askew lied about her advances and
then attempted to cover them Up.148
Askew's case is very unusual because the General Assembly had
a debatable issue in the sexual harassment claim leveled against
Askew. The rhetoric of the legislators involved in the hearing
made clear that the real issue was Askew's perceived sexual orientation. 149 In one of the more telling questions from the session, dele-

'43 See Larry O'Dell, Assembly Elects Former Delegate to Supreme Court. DAILY PRESS, Jan.
21,
2003,
http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-va-xgrjudges0121jan21,0,1340489.story; Halladay, supra note 125; Jeff E. Schapiro &
Pamela Stallsmith, Tension Pervades Assembly; Relations Unravel Over Askew Matter,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2003, at A-I.
144 R. H. Melton, GOP Grilling ofjudge in Va. Has Aura of a Tria~ WASI-l. POST, Jan.
18,2003, at BOL
''', See Alan Cooper, judge Deni£s Woman s ClULrge; Assembly Panels Hear Testirrwny in
joint Session, RiCHMOND TIMES DISPATcH,Jan. 18,2003, at B-1.
146 O'Dell, supra note 143.
147 See id.
148 Sodomy
Laws,
Virginia
Denies
Askew
Seat,
http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/virginia/vanews102.htm (last visited on Oct. 17,
2007).
'49 The Republican Assembly denied Judge Askew's reappointment based more on
her sexual orientation and an allegation of sexual harassment than on her judicial
performance. See Whitley & Cooper, supra note 142.
The Canons govern judicial conduct outside the courtroom as well. The Commentary to Canon 3B(5) states that "ajudge must refrain from speech, gestures or
other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment." See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. Canon 3C(1) states that "ajudge shall diligendy discharge the judge's responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial administration." See id.
However, Judge Askew did not dishonor these rules. Nowhere in the Canons
does the sexual orientation of a jurist affect his or her conduct, competence, fitness to serve, or the public's confidence in his or her judicial independence. See
generally id. Indeed, the Canons preclude a judge from undertaking the precise
prejudicial and biased behavior exhibited towards Judge Askew in her reappointment proceedings.
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gate Robert McDonnell reportedly asked a witness how close Askew
was sitting to a female friend at a recent dinner. 15o
For many candidates evaluated for reappointment in the past
several years, political issues and the social agenda of the General
Assembly marred the reappointment process. These judges, applying the law and reasoning in a wholly unexceptionable manner,
decided cases and issued opinions, which members of the Republican-controlled General Assembly perceived as failing the conservative litmus test. Two of these cases concerned the rights of a gay
parent, and one concerned gun control.
A. Justice Barbara Keenan

In January 2003, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Barbara M.
151
Keenan sought reappointment.
Republicans in the General As52
sembly grilled Justice Keenan, as usual in an unreported session/
153
about her dissenting opinion in Bottoms v. Bottoms. The case concerned a maternal grandmother'S petition, filed against her daugh154
ter, for custody of her grandson.
The Virginia Supreme Court
reversed an appellate court decision and granted custody of the
child to the child's grandmother, stating that one of the factors
considered was the mother's lesbian relationship at the time of the
155
custody hearing.
In reaching its decision, the majority determined that the sexual orientation of the mother would impose a
burden on the child and that the child would suffer social condemnation stemming from exposure to homosexual living ar156
rangements.
Chairman of the House Courts of Justice Committee, Del. Robert McDonnell
(R-Virginia Beach), indicated that lawmakers have a duty to review judges' work
product and actions when up for re-election. O'Dell, supra note 14S. Also, according to McDonnell, individuals may not be fit to serve as judges if they violate
the state's now debunked "crimes against nature" laws that prohibited all oral and
anal sex. See Halladay, supra note 125. This statement instigated counterarguments from judicial selection experts, who remarked that the sexual orientation characteristics of judges were not part of any codified judicial selection criteria. Id. McDonnell's vision stands in contradiction to any vision that treats homosexuals equally, either through a role on the bench or under the law.
150 Panel
Ousts Judge They Tried to Out, THE GAY PEOPLE'S CHRONICLE,
http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories03/03jan31.htm.
151 See Christina Nuckols, Concerns Arise OverJudge Selection; At the Center of the General
Assembly Issue Are Questions Over Sexual Orientatio~ VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 17,2003, at
Bl.
152 See id.
153Bottomsv. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Va. 1995) (Kennan,]., dissenting).
154 Id. at 104.
155 I d. at lOS'{)9.
156 Id. at lOS.
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Keenan dissented and maintained that the trial court improperly found the mother per se unfit because of her sexual orienta157
tion.
In her dissent, Keenan referenced the controlling law in
the Commonwealth and the majority of states that "[a] lesbian
mother is not per se an unfit parent.,,158 Keenan asserted that the
court of appeals was correct when it found that "adverse effects of a
parent's homosexuality on a child cannot be assumed without specific proof.,,159 Keenan continued that "[a]lthough there is no evidencein this record showing that the mother's homosexual conduct is harmful to the child, the majority improperly presumes that
its own perception of societal opinion and the mother's homosexual conduct are germane to the issue [of] whether the mother is an
unfit parent."I60 Keenan rejected the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision as wholly based on societal perception and norms, rather
161
than the issue of law at hand.
Keenan's dissent attempts to be
faithful to the law rather than a personal perception of societal
opinion. She rigorously abided by the Canons, acting within their
letter and spirit, especially with regard to the requirement for im. 1.lty. 162
partla
Canon One requires a judge to "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary" which under Section A, "is indispensable to justice in our society.,,163 The Commentary to Canon One
provides that a judge must act "without fear or favor" and "must
comply with the law."I64 Justice Keenan met the mandate of Canon
One by rejecting the trial court's failure to follow the law. She refused to favor a societal predisposition or succumb to a fear that
her view would be unpopular or politically unacceptable.
Canon Two requires a judge to avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.165 While the Canon generally deals with a
judge'S professional and personal behavior, it can also indirectly
extend to decision-making. Thus, Section A states that a judge
"shall respect and comply with the law" and "promotes public con-

Id. at 109 (citing Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981)).
[d. See also Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981).
159 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 283 (Va. Ct App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d
102 (Va. 1995). See also Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805.
160 BoUoms, 457 S.E.2d at 109.
161 [d.
162 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4 (purporting, in the commentary,
that a judge who manifests any bias in the proceedings brings the judiciary into
disrepute) .
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
157

158
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fidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. ,,166 Section
B provides that "[a] judge shall not allow family, social, political or
other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or
judgment.,,167 Justice Keenan followed these precepts by freeing
her opinion of any family, social or political prejudice, or influence. Accordingly, she sought to promote the judicial integrity and
impartiality mandated by Canon Two.
Canon Three requires a judge to "perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.,,168 Under Section B(2), "a
judge shall be faithful to the law" and "not be swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism."169 By refusing to grant
child custody to a grandmother over a lesbian mother, Justice
Keenan sought to follow the law, without regard for the potential of
public clamor or judicial criticism. Under Section B(5), ajudge is
required to "perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice" and
cannot "in the performance of judicial duties ... manifest bias or
prejudice."170 Justice Keenan rejected the trial court's decision as
one rooted in prejudice, societal perception and expectation, not
the rule of law. She ably discharged her duty under Canon
171
Three.
Republican legislators made their views on homosexuality and
their conservative agenda clear through their questioning.172 Equal173
ity Virginia chairman Joseph R. Price accused Republican delegates of "a targeted effort to get rid of judges they think are sympathetic to gay issues."174 Democratic delegate Kenneth R. Melvin
expressed concerns over Republican legislators' "inordinate curiosity about legal opinions that touch upon sexual orientation."175 Republican delegate Bradley P. Marrs countered Melvin's comment,
stating that "[h]omosexuality is a form of sexual misconduct that is
See id.
See id.
168 See Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
169 See id.
170 See id.
17l See also id. (explaining, in the commentary, that "[a] judge who manifests bias
on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the
judiciary into disrepute").
172 See Nuckols, supra note 15l.
m "Equality Virginia is a state-wide, non-partisan lobbying, education and support
network for the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and straight allied (GLBT)
commumtles
in
Virginia."
See
About
Equality
Virginia,
http://www.equalityvirginia.org/site/pp.asp?c=dflIITMIG&b=132619 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2007).
174 Nuckols, supra note 151.
175Id.
166

167
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a crime
I don't believe in the genetic explanation of homosexuality, so to say someone is a homosexual means that person is
engaged in illegal behavior on a regular basis.,,176 Of course, Judge
Keenan's dissent tracked to jurisprudence of the majority opinion
177
in Lawrence v. Texas.
A full eight years before the U.S. Supreme
Court reached its decision, Keenan found her way to a similar
analysis.
The General Assembly ultimately reappointed Keenan, but
178
only after thoroughly scrutinizing her dissent in Bottoms.
This
scrutiny served to chill the independence of other judges, especially those who needed reappointment to achieve full retirement
benefits.
B. Judge Rosemarie Annunziata

With Justice Keenan, the General Assembly frankly articulated
the conservative ideological litmus test which it intended to use in
the judicial reappointment process. Also in 2003, but after the
Keenan hearing, the General Assembly reinforced the litmus test in
179
its questioning of court of appeals Judge Rosemarie Annunziata.
The House Courts of Justice Committee postponed reappointing
Judge Rosemarie Annunziata to the Virginia Court of Appeals,180
asking her to return for an additional round of questioning before
181
sending her nomination to the full legislature.
This outright
preparation for interrogation of a judicial candidate was an aberra182
tion from the past norm of judicial reappointment.
Republicans on the Committee were specifically concerned
183
with Annunziata's opinion in Piatt v. Piatt.
In Piatt, the Virginia
Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision granting primary
184
physical custody of a divorced couple's child to the husband.
Mter the couple separated, both the husband and wife had extra18S
marital sexual relationships with women. Both husband and wife,

176Id.

539 u.s. 558 (2003).
See Nuckols, supra note 151.
179 See O'Dell, supra note 143.
ISO Nuckols, supra note 15I.
ISIId. See also Steven Ginsberg & Michael D. Shear, In Va., Fears of a Judicial Litmus
I77

17S

Test; Delay in Reappointment Highlights Tensions Over House Review Process, WASH.

POST,jan. 16,2003, at B01.
IS2

See id.

499 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
IS4Id. at 572.
185 Id. at 569.

IS.
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arguably, violated the Virginia statutes: he, the fomication l86 and
adulteryl87 statutes and she, the consensual sodomy statute. 188 On
appeal, the wife claimed that the lower court improperly based its
189
decision on the parties' sexual orientation.
The appellate court
d .190
·
d lsagree
In her dissent, Judge Annunziata found for the wife, maintaining that the trial court "applied different standards when evaluating
the parties' post-separation sexual conduct.,,191 Annunziata reasoned that the Court should have remanded the case and applied a
192
more symmetrical analysis of the law.
Since both parents engaged in similar, arguably illegal, behavior, Judge Annunziata disagreed with the majority opinion that described the mother's conduct as promiscuous, while asserting that the father's conduct cre193
ated a secure environment for the child.
Annunziata reasoned
that the trial judge, who granted custody to the father, applied "different standards when evaluating the parties' post-separation sexual
conduct.,,194 Like Keenan, Annunziata chose to apply the law
equally to both parties, in accordance with an unexceptionable
interpretation of the prevailing common law and statutes. Moreover, she followed the letter and spirit of the Canons in her dissent,
particularly with regard to the standards for impartiality.195
During Judge Annunziata's lengthy reappointment hearing,
again without a record, Del. Bradley P. Marrs, a Republican from
196
Richmond, questioned Annunziata about her dissenting opinion.
Marrs held that "[t]he case was about whether homosexual conduct
and heterosexual conduct were on the same plane.,,197 Continuing,
Marrs stated that Annunziata "indicated that they were. I believe
they were not. There were a host of factors relied upon for that
decision. She chose to emphasize that one issue.,,198 Marrs' ideology, however, runs directly counter to the law of the Common186YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (West 2007). This statute has since been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367
(Ya.2005).
18'YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (West 2007).
188 YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (West 2007).
189 Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 572.
[d.
[d. at 574 (Annunziata,]., dissenting).
192 [d.
193 [d. at 573.
194 [d. at 574.
190
191

See grmerally Canons of]udicial Conduct, supra note 4.
See Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 18I.
19' [d.
198 [d.
195

196
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wealth at the time of the Piatt decision. Under the law, courts were
required to apply the same standard to decide what effect a nonmarital relationship will have on a child regardless of sexuality.l99
What is problematic is that Annunziata chose to follow the law correctly and faced the retaliation of the litmus test. The treatment of
Annunziata prompted some Democrats to express concerns that
reappointing judges based on their ideologies undermined judicial
201
independence.2OO Some Republicans agreed.
Because the reappointment hearing for Annunziata was unusually long and exceptionally political, the potential for chilling other judges from acting
in accordance with the Canons, but in conflict with majority political opinion, looms large.
In her dissent, Judge Annunziata maintained that different
standards of acceptable behavior should not be employed in evalu202
ating the "post-separation sexual behavior" of divorcing spouses.
Both the husband and wife had extramarital sexual relations with
women, yet the majority of the court of appeals found the wife's
conduct impermissibly promiscuous while the father's similar conduct did not jeopardize the child's well being.20s Judge Annunziata
pointed to the legal requirement for symmetry.204 She maintained
that different standards should not be imposed in determining parental fitness based on societal prejudice, ideology or sexual pref205
erence.
Judge Annunziata followed the provisions of Canons
One, Two, and Three and the Sections relating to ajudge's faithful
adherence to the rule of law, impartiality, independence and freedom from bias, prejudice and partisanship,. These provisions, as
described above, relate equally to the conduct and decision-making
of Judge Annunziata. A judicial ruling based on ideology, rather
than the impartial application of the governing legal standard, underminesjudicial independence and the public's confidence in the
judiciary.206

199 See Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 570 (asserting that the effect of a non-marital relationship
on a child is not based on the parents' involvement in a homosexual or heterosexual relationship but "whether it has had any adverse impact on the child.").
200 Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 18I.
201 I d.
202 Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 574.
20. Id. at 570-74 (Annunziata,j., dissenting) .
... Id. at 572-74 (Annunziata,j., dissenting).
205 [d.
206 See also Canons ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 4.
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C. Judge Alfred Swersky

The General Assembly's recent openly biased and conservative
agenda is clear not only in legal matters pertaining to homosexuals
but also in other politically charged issues, specifically gun control.
In January 2002, Alexandria Circuit Court Judge Alfred D. Swersky
appeared before the House Courts of Justice Committee seeking
207
reappointment.
For over an hour, House Speaker S. Vance Wilkins, Jr., who later claimed to dislike "activist judges who want to
make the law on their own," questioned Swersky about his unpub20B
lished, trial-level decision from a case in Alexandria, Virginia. In
the case, Judge Swersky upheld an Alexandria ordinance barring
209
firearms from municipal worksites.
Although Swersky's holding
in the case was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, the Republican-controlled General Assembly scrutinized and questioned
210
Swersky about it.
Republican Speaker Wilkins, who sponsored a
1989 state statute prohibiting localities from regulating ownership
or possession of firearms, led the charge.211 Wilkins' intense questioning concerned many members of the General Assembly, especially Democrats in the House who believed that rulings on gun
cases would become "litmus tests for reappointment to judicial
posts.,,212 The General Assembly eventually reappointed Swersky.213
In the case mentioned above, Judge Swersky upheld an ordinance prohibiting firearms at public work sites.214 He did so in
accordance with a specific regulation, rather than any ideological
or political motive, basing his decision on his interpretation of
regulations aimed at preventing violent, disruptive behavior in city
workplaces. 215 Judge Swersky acted without "fear or favor,,216 and
207 R. H. Melton, House Speaker Presses Judge on Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at
BOS.
208Id.
209 Id. In his opinion, Swersky determined that the city manager had authority to
control and regulate the use and management of handguns on city property. [d.
The manager, Lawson, ordered the ban on firearms shortly after a shooting in
front of a city recreation center. Id. Swersky applied the law without ideological
motive and interpreted existing regulations prohibiting "violent, disruptive or
inappropriate behavior by members of the public in City workplaces" to uphold
the city ordinance. Melton, supra note 207.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212Id.
21. See Lisa Rein, Va. House Votes to Overturn Gun Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 2S, 2002, at
B01; Michael D. Shear & Patricia Davis, Va. GOP Reclaims Naming ofJudges; Legislators Move to Preempt Warner. WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at COL
214 See Sentiger v. Lawson, CH9S1074 (AlexandriaCir. Ct.Jan.13, 1999).
215 Id.

28

CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

made his decision without regard for "partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism.,,217 Since gun control is a politically
charged issue, Judge Swersky's decision more than likely politically
unpopular, and thus, it had the potential to have adverse consequences on his reappointment. Nonetheless, Judge Swersky, following the Canons, refused to bow to political or societal pressure
or fear and faithfully interpreted the law. He upheld the letter and
spirit of the Canon, and he continued to maintain his interpretation of the law throughout his contentious reappointment hear. 218
mg.
Befitting the troubles Swersky faced in re-appointment, the
process of selecting his replacement to the circuit court was another overtly politicized process, with the General Assembly showing little regard for the qualifications and temperament of the can219
didates.
In the spring of 2003, Judge Alfred D. Swersky an220
nounced his plans to retire from the bench. Following tradition,
the selection committee accepted applications from candidates,
conducted interviews, and gave reviews to the Bar members who
221
then voted.
Nolan B. Dawkins, a ten-year veteran judge in the
juvenile court and a lifetime resident of the city of, received a rating of "exceptionally qualified" from the selection committee and
222
"won" the Bar vote.
In May, after the legislative session ended,
five Democratic members of the General Assembly recommended
that Governor Warner appoint Judge Dawkins to replace Judge
Swersky.223 In July, Republicans announced that if Warner ap-

21. VA. SUP. Cr. R. Pr. 6, § III, Cannon 1 Cmt. (1999).
217VA. SUP. CT. R. Pr. 6, § III, Canon 3(B) (2) (1999).
218 See ge1'Uffal1y email from Judge Alfred D. Swersky, Alexandria Circuit Court Judge,
to Author (August, 2003) (on file with author). Judge Swersky described that "the
return to the practice of law loomed large," but that he never intended to change
his interpretation of the law to appease legislators since that reversal would have
been motivated by fear of losing his job rather than his own opinion. Id.
219 See Shear & Davis, supra note 213.
220 See id.
221 See Interview with Melinda Douglas, Public Defender for City of Alexandria, and
Jim Lay, Assistant Attorney for Commonwealth of Va., in Alexandria, Va. (July,
2004) (on file with author). The Judicial Selection Committee of the Alexandria
Bar Association follows established guidelines in interviewing, evaluating, and
rating judicial candidates. Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay were both members of
the Judicial Selection Committee.
222 Id.
m See Carla Branch, Assembly Punts Nominees to Governar, THE CONNECI10N
NEWSPAPERS,
Mar.
10,
2004,
http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/article.asp?archive=true&article=29796&
paper=59&cat= 104.
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pointed Dawkins while the General Assembly recessed, they might
later decline to approve him for a full term. 224
While Judge Dawkins remains on the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in the 18th district,Judge Lisa Kemler, the runnerup in the bar vote who accepted a temporary appointment by Governor Warner inJune, 2004,225 was appointed to the circuit court by
226
the General Assembly in January 2005. A number of Alexandria
Bar members describe Judge Kemler's appointment to the Circuit
Court bench as a "horse trade" in the General Assembly which put
Connie Frogale on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in
227
Alexandria.

V.

CONCLUSION

On February 19, 2003, the General Assembly filled twenty-five
judicial vacancies without much controversy.228 Virginia Governor
Mark R. Warner, a Democrat, criticized the Republicans in the legislature, stating "[ilt sure did seem to me that the process was not
the unbiased and impartial process that we'd like to see in our judicial reappointments.,,229 Most of the grilling of judicial candidates about their political ideologies and past decision occurred in
230
the House of Delegates.
Despite encouragement from their colleagues to follow suit, for the most part, Republican state senators
have declined to engage in such interrogation and instead consider
231
only a candidate's qualifications. Some have even expressed con-

See Shear & Davis, supra note 213.
.
Chris L. Jenkins, Warner Makes New Pick far Circuit Court; Alexandria Judge Withdraws, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at BOL Judge Kemler had been a substitute
judge before her appointment, and she received an "exceptionally qualified" rating from the Alexandria Bar Association. Id. In the bar vote, she was runner-up to
Judge Dawkins in what was described by members of the Judicial Selection Committee as "a close vote." Id.
226 Michael Lee Pope, Kemler Takes Seat on Circuit Court, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE
PACKET, Mar. 4, 2005, http://subvatican.com/gazette/kemler.html.
227 See id.; Branch, supra note 223. Fragale was a candidate for the Juvenile Court
bench in a field of ten candidates. Branch, supra note 223. She received a "qualified" (one step above "unqualified"). Id. She did not win the bar vote; Barbara
Beach, the only candidate who received a "highly qualified" rating, won the bar
vote. Id.
228 See Tyler Whitley, McClanahan to FiU Court Slot; Legislature Elects Judges. RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 2003, at A-6 (showing that although the court slots were
filled, the Democrats attempt to re-elect Askew failed).
229 Warren Fiske, For First Time, Warner Strongly Criticizes GOP; He Faults Abortion Bills,
Questioning ofJudge. VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2003, at AI.
2'" Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 181.
2>1 Id.
224
225
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cern over the tactics employed by their counterparts in the House
232
o f De Iegates.
Due to the realities of the judicial appointment process in Virginia, ajudge's actions and ideologies may be the determining fac233
tor in his or her reappointment. Overall, politics do motivate the
judicial selection and reappointment process in the Common234
wealth.
The risks underlying reappointment cloud the virtues of
the Canons. For instance, a judge seeking reappointment may opt
to write opinions or reason according to a legislator's wishes, relying on that legislator'S vote in the General Assembly. The risk of
losing the large retirement benefit makes judges less likely to take a
politically unpopular path in his or her decision-making, even if
that path represents the appropriate legal decision. As a result, in
order to protect his job and secure reappointment, a judge will rule
on a politically sensitive case under the guise of impartiality, but in
reality, decide the issue according to the wishes of the majority
party in the General Assembly.235
Conversely, other judges follow the wisdom of the Canons236
and Bar Association doctrines and make decisions counter to majoritarian or legislative opinion by using fair and impartial adjudication. These judges' decisions are in stark contrast with the slew
of conservative and ideologically based opinions issued in the Commonwealth and lead to a heightened scrutiny of the reasoning
since they typically fall short of the conservative agenda. 237 These
decisions often cause alarm in the General Assembly because of the
238
politically unpopular implications of "liberal" precedent.
What
this paper shows is that in Virginia, judges who care more about the
impartial interpretation of the law, and less about the politics and
2..

[d.

See Ashley Taylor, Judging the Judges-The Selection of a New State Supreme Court Justice
Next Year Will Reveal Whether Vi7ginia Has Been Corrupted by the Politicization_of the
Judicial-Approval Process in Washington, BACON'S REBELLION, Oct. 28, 2002,
233

http://www.baconsrebellion.com/lssues/10-28-02/Judges_aTaylor.htm.
See id. (stating that although the judicial selection process is "not as openly partisan and hostile as the process at the federal level, [it] is nevertheless an expression
of political power").
235 This would be a case where a judge nearing the end of his term decided a case
based on an obvious conservative agenda that was dearly poorly decided but the
Assembly did not scrutinize the decision.
236 "A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige
of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a
judge conveyor permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
eosition to influence thejudge." VA. SUP. CT. R. Pr. 6, § III, Canon 2(B) (1999).
37 See generally Nuckols, supra note 151.
234

2""

See id.
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financial risks of counter-majoritarian thought, face the reality of a
litmus test for Virginia reappointments which oftentimes results in
2s9
a loss ofjob security and judicial retirement benefits.

239

See id.

